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Abstract
It is well−known that the efficient−bargain model imposes no general restrictions on the
slope of the contract curve. As a result, both upward− and downward−sloping curves are
consistent with the theory. Less is known, however, about the effect on the contract curve of
changes in the demand and supply variables that underlie employer and union indifference
maps and help determine curve's position. To aid empirical researchers, this paper analyzes
the effects of demand and supply variables on the position of the contract curve and states the
minimal prior restrictions that can be placed on these effects.
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McDonald and Solow's(1981)e±cient-bargain model hasattracted considerable attention
in the collective bargaining literature. Under this model, bargaining outcomes lie along a
contract curve comprised of tangencies between union and employer indi®erence curves in
wage-employment space. The e±cient-bargain model has become the principal alternative
to the standard monopoly-union model of the bargaining process, under which the union
picks its preferred point on the employer's demand curve for labor.1
It is well-known that the e±cient-bargain model imposes no general restrictions on the
slope of the contract curve. As a result, both upward- and downward-sloping curves are
consistent with the theory. Less is known, however, about the e®ect on the contract curve of
changes in the demand and supply variables that underlie employer and union indi®erence
maps and help determine the curve's position. Examples of such variablesare the alternative
wage (a supply variable) and community population in a public sector model (a demand
variable). To aid empirical researchers, the present paper analyzes the e®ects of demand
and supply variables on the position of the contract curve and states the minimal prior
restrictions that can be placed on these e®ects. Brueckner and O'Brien (1989) were able to
reject the e±cient-bargain model for several public employee samples by appealing to these
restrictions.
2. Analysis
To begin the analysis, itisassumed thatunion preferencesoverthe wage w and employmentL
are represented by the utility function V (w; L; ¯), where ¯ isa supply variable. This function
is strictly quasi-concave in its ¯rst two arguments, and an increase in ¯ is assumed to °atten
indi®erence curvesin L¡w space (w ison the vertical axis). The marginal rate of substitution
VL=Vw is thus a decreasing function of ¯. An example of such a utility function is given by
McDonald and Solow (1981). Letting z(w) (a strictly concave function) give the utility of
working at wage w, expected utility for a union member is z(w)L=N + z(wa)(1 ¡ L=N),
where wa is the wage in alternative (non-union) employment and L=N is the probability of
union employment (N is union membership). The alternative wage plays the role of ¯ under
this formulation, and it is easily seen that the marginal rate of substitution between w and
L is decreasing in wa.
It is convenient to invert the equation V(w; L; ¯) = v de¯ning an indi®erence curve
so that it reads w = h(L; ¯; v) (v is some constant utility level). The function h satis¯es
hL = ¡VL=Vw < 0; hLL > 0 (by quasi-concavity), and hv = 1=Vw > 0 (the e®ect of ¯ is
discussed below).
Without specifying the details of the institutional setting, the employer's objective func-
tion is written U(w; L; ®), where ® is a demand variable. As an example, suppose that the
employer's output is produced with labor alone according to the strictly concave function
f(L) and that utility is measured by pro¯t. Then U becomes pf(L)¡ wL, where p (which
plays the role of the demand variable) is output price.
1Contributions to the literature on e±cient bargains include Brown and Ashenfelter (1986), Eberts and
Stone (1986), and MaCurdy and Pencavel (1986).
1The labor demand curve used in the monopoly-union bargainingmodel is found by choos-
ing L to maximize U for ¯xed w, solving UL(w; L; ®) = 0: Under the assumption ULL < 0,
the second-order condition for this problem is satis¯ed, and it follows that UL is positive to
the left and negative to the right of the labor demand curve. The employer's indi®erence
curves are de¯ned by U(w; L; ®) = u for some constant u, and the slope of an indi®erence
curve equals ¡UL=Uw: Given the behavior of UL and the factthatUw is negative, indi®erence
curves are upward-sloping to the left and downward-sloping to the right of the labor demand
curve. An increase in the demand variable is assumed to increase the indi®erence curve slope
(¡UL=Uw is an increasing function of ®), so that a larger ® makes the indi®erence curves
steeper to the left and °atter to the right of the demand curve. The higher ® also moves the
demand curve to the right. As in the case of the union indi®erence curves, it is convenient to
invert the equation U(w; L; ®) = u so that the employer's indi®erence curves can be written
w = g(L; ®; u), where gL = ¡UL=Uw and gu = 1=Uw < 0 (the e®ect of ® will be discussed
below).
Before discussing the contract curve, further analysis of the functions h and g is needed.
First, it is necessary to express the assumption that VL=Vw is decreasing in ¯ in terms of the
function h. The assumption means that the absolute slope expression ¡hL is decreasing in ¯
provided thatthe utility level v adjuststohold w constantas ¯ changes. The adjustment in v
restrictsthe focustoan indi®erence curve passingthrough a particular(L; w)point, which by
assumption becomes °atter. Thus, it must be the case that ¡(hL¯ +hLv[dv=d¯]) < 0, where
dv=d¯ is the utility change required to keep w constant as ¯ increases. By di®erentiation of
w = h(L; ¯;v); dv=d¯ equals ¡h¯=hv, so that the required condition is
hL¯ ¡hLvh¯=hv > 0: (1)
By exactly analogous reasoning, g must satisfy
gL® ¡gLug®=gu > 0 (2)
for UL=Uw to be decreasing in ®:
Normality of w (alternatively L) in union preferences requires that the union indi®erence
curves become steeper (°atter) moving vertically (horizontally) in the (L; w) plane. Because
employer utility rises moving toward the origin, the opposite behavior is required of the
employer indi®erence curves, with normality of w (alternatively L) requiring the curves to
become °atter (steeper) moving vertically (horizontally). By calculations similar to those
above, these requirements yield, respectively, the following normality conditions:2
hLv < 0 (3)
hLL ¡hLvhL=hv > 0 (4)
gLu < 0 (5)
gLL ¡gLugL=gu < 0: (6)
2It can be shown that in the examples considered above, the union indi®erence map exhibits normality
for both w and L, while L is inferior in the employer indi®erence map (a horizontal movement, however, has
an ambiguous e®ect on the slope of the employer's curves).
2With the appropriate background in place, the analysis of the contract curve can now
begin. The contract curve is de¯ned by following equation system:
w = g(L; ®;u) (7)
w = h(L;¯;v) (8)
gL(L; ®; u) = hL(L; ¯; v) (9)
Equations (7) and (8) indicate that employer and union indi®erence curves intersect, and
(9) says that the intersection involves a tangency. For this tangency to represent a Pareto-
e±cient bargaining outcome, it must be the case that gLL < hLL, so that the employer's
indi®erence curve is less convex than the union's.3
The equation of the contract curve is found by treating L in the system (7) { (9) as ¯xed
and solving for the remaining variables. The resulting solution is written
4
w = w(L; ®;¯); (10)
and the goal of the analysis is to sign the partial derivatives this function. Totally di®eren-
tiating the system (7) { (9), the slope of the contract curve is given by




[gLL ¡gLugL=gu] ¡[hLL ¡hLvhL=hv]
hLv=hv ¡gLu=gu
: (11)
The sign of (11) depends on whether L and w are normal goods in employer and union
preferences. If w is normal in both cases, then the numerator of (11) is negative (recall (4)
and (6)). If L is normal in both cases, then the denominator isalso negative given that hv > 0
and gu < 0(recall (3)and (5)). Normality ofboth goodstherefore impliesthat(11) ispositive
and that the contract curve is upward sloping. If, on the other hand, w is inferior and L is
normal for both the employer and the union, then (4) and (6) are reversed. The numerator
of (11) then becomes positive, and the contract curve is downward sloping. Similarly, if w
is normal but L is inferior, then (3) and (5) are reversed, the denominator of (11) becomes
positive, and the contract curve is again downward sloping. Finally, if L (alternatively w) is
neither normal nor inferior for both the employer and union, implying that equality holds in
(3) and (5) (in (4) and (6)), then the contract curve is vertical (horizontal). In all admissible
circumstances other than those just listed, the sign of (11) is indeterminate and the contract
curve could slope up or down.5
Even though an explicit proof has not appeared in the literature, the above results are
generally known. The e®ects of the demand and supply variables ® and ¯ on the position of
the contract curve are, however, less well understood. The following analysis develops the
3Satisfaction of this condition is not guaranteed and must be assumed.
4Alternatively, the equation could give L in terms of w. The choice of dependent variable is immaterial.
5When the utility functions take the forms considered in the above examples, the contract curve turns
out to be upward sloping. This is shown explicitly by McDonald and Solow (1981).










Given that the numerators of (12) and (13) are positive by (1) and (2), the signs of @w=@®
and @w=@¯ depend on the sign of the common denominator. Although the latter expression
has a determinate sign when L is normal or inferior in both indi®erence maps, the goal
is to make a statement that is independent of preferences.6 The following result can be
established:
Proposition. When the contract curve is °at or upward sloping, an increase in
the demand variable shifts the curve down (@w=@® < 0) and an increase in the
supply variable shifts it up (@w=@¯ > 0). When the contract curve is downward
sloping, demand and supply shifts may have either sign but must be in opposite
directions.
To prove this result, note ¯rst that since @w=@® has the sign of hLv=hv ¡gLu=gu while @w=@¯
has minus this sign, demand and supply shifts are always in opposite directions regardless of
the slope of the contract curve. The shifts can be signed, however, in the °at and upward-





Since the denominator of (14) is positive and gLL¡hLL < 0 must hold for the tangency point
to be optimal, it follows that
sign[@w=@®] = ¡sign[@w=@L ¡gL]: (15)
To interpret(15), note that the right-hand side dependson the di®erence between the slope of
the contract curve and the (negative) slope of the indi®erence curves at the tangency point.7
While this di®erence can have either sign when the contract curve is downward sloping, the
di®erence must be positive when the curve is °at or upward sloping. Therefore, in the °at
and upward-sloping cases, (15) implies that @w=@® is negative and hence that @w=@¯ is
positive, as claimed. When the contract curve is downward sloping, this result is preserved
provided that the curve is °atter than the indi®erence curves, in which case @w=@L > gL:
The reverse impacts occur when the contractcurve is steeper than the indi®erence curves (in
this case @w=@® and @w=@¯ are respectively positive and negative). However, since these
6Using a specialized model, Gyourko and Tracy (1988) proved that the contract curve shifts down in
response to a demand increase when L is normal in both the union and employer indi®erence maps. This
result, which can be seen in (12), is never used in their paper since the analysis is devoted to estimating
reduced-form wage equations.
7Recall the gL = hL at the tangency.
4slope relationships are unobservable, all that can be said in the downward-sloping case is
that demand and supply shifts must be in opposite directions.8
The proposition is illustrated in Figures 1 and 2, which show the e®ect of an increase in
the demand variable (recall that this °attens the employer's indi®erence curves). Figure 1
illustrates the downward shift of an upward-sloping contract curve, case A in Figure 2 shows
the same outcome in the case of relatively °at downward-sloping curve, and case B shows
the upward shift of a steep downward-sloping curve. Note that cases A and B are based on
di®erent union indi®erence maps.9
Using the prior restrictions from the proposition, Brueckner and O'Brien (1989) rejected
the e±cient bargain model for three national cross-section samples of ¯re, police, and sanita-
tion workers. The estimated contract curve for each sample was downward sloping, so that
only the weak opposite-sign restriction applies. However, in each case, the coe±cients on
community population (the most important demand variable) and the manufacturing wage
(a key supply variable) were both positive and signi¯cant, in violation of the opposite-sign
restriction.
3. Conclusion
This paper has analyzed the e®ects of supply and demand variables on the position of the
contract curve and developed prior restrictions on the directions of these e®ects. Estimated
contract curves must conform to these restrictions to be consistent with the underlying
model. It is hoped that the restrictions will prove useful to researchers engaged in empirical
implementation of the e±cient-bargain model.
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